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LAW AND LEARNING REVISITED:
DISCOURSE, THEORY AND RESEARCH*
By JOHANN W. MOHR**
The article first reviews the major lines of discussion following the
publication of Law and Learning It then focuses on the position of
theory and research in legal education and scholarship and attempts to
argue that law proper can neither be derived inductively from empirical
positions, nor deductively from universal propositions but is a constituted
account, a form of discourse, a pure theory; or in its negative expression
a simulacrum dependent on recognition rather than reference. Its
autonomy is thus purely formal and cannot be used to distinguish law
substantively from other forms of discourse, such as science and politics
which indeed give law its content.
I. THE STRUCTURES OF THE ARGUMENT
The Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRc) by the Consultative Group on Research
and Education in Law was published in the spring of 1983.1 A
great deal of discussion has been generated by the Report; there
Copyright, 1987, Johann W. Mohr
** J.W. Mohr is a Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I Law and Learning. Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada by the Consultative Group on Education in Law. (SSHRC, Minister of Supply and
Services, Canada, 1983) (Chair, H.W. Arthurs). There have also been a host of background
studies including: Canadian Law Faculties: Sources of Support for Legal Research (by John
S. McKennirey, SSHRC, 1982); Profile of Published Legal Research (by Alice Janisch, SSHRC,
1982). Eight volumes of Documentation (SSHRC, 1981/82); Four Reports on Regional
Consultations (Prairies, April 1981); Atlantic Provinces, June 1981; Ontario, November 1981;
Quebec, December 1981). Following the Report appeared: Reviews and Comments on Law
and Learning (SSHRC, July 1984) and Additional Reviews of Law and Learning (SSHRC,
February 1985).
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was a heated open forum at the Law Teachers Meeting of the
Learned Societies in Vancouver,2 and a National Conference on
Legal Research and Education in Canada.3 In July, 1984, the SSHRC
published Reviews and Comments on Law and Learning and its 121
pages contain by no means all that had been written on the subject.
4
In February, 1985 Additional Reviews of Law and Learning
appeared,5 but from then on a search of the literature becomes
difficult, since most of the references to the Report are contained
in a variety of articles. Other developments could also be associated
with the Report, such as the founding of the Canadian Law and
Society Association. 6 Thus, there has been much activity during the
first three years following the publication of the Report and no
assessment at this time can be complete. This review will attempt
to trace the major lines of the responses to the Report and develop
further two aspects which are essential to legal scholarship and
education: theory and research.
Responses vary a great deal in terms of perceptions,
attitudes, and moods, and make visible strong contradictions in the
assumptions of what the Report says. What does the Report say?
This, of course, is a naive question. The field of discourse which
has emerged could in fact serve as an exemplary case study for the
2 June, 1983. The major lines of critique and defense were already clearly visible at this
forum. The major objections seemed to base themselves on the complaint that not enough
credit had been given to the work done and the major defense was that the purpose of the
report was not to celebrate the status quo, but to seek a new direction. The feeling that legal
scholarship and legal scholars had been slighted comes through in a number of subsequent
responses. The papers published in (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. were not yet available to me
in writing this paper. John D. McCamus makes a similar observation and Harry Arihurs gives
a further clarification.
3 December, 1983. Besides a general review of the Report and the Initial Responses
there were eight workshops, covering Funding, Research Strategies, Professional and
Community Impact, Joint Ventures, Research Instruments, Prognosis, Graduate Studies and
Prospects for an Academic Stream. See Proceedings, John McLaren, Univ. of Calgary, 1986.
4 Reviews and Comments, supra, note 1.
5 Aditional Reviews, supra, note 1.
6 Its first president, John McLaren of Calgary, had also been the organizer of the Forum
and the National Conference.
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present vogue of deconstruction in literary criticism.7 It would be
appropriate to apply structuralist methods to the analysis of this
discourse since the Report itself deals largely with the structuring of
legal research and education, focusing on context rather than specific
forms of the content of law. The same holds for the four research
reports published separately! One could further apply
consensus/conflict theories but this would first require determining
the ground of consensus and the background of conflict. That the
document is perceived to be a political one (small "p") emerges very
clearly from a number of responses; from others it can be inferred.
The several highly emotive responses cannot just be ascribed to
wounded sensibilities or professional pride, although these too are
at times obvious.
Generally, the Report expresses the historical and contextual
assumptions on which its value judgments are based; on the other
hand, responses rarely disclose their basic assumptions. This often
leads to apparently contradictory preferential readings. For example,
the Initial Response, on Behalf of the Canadian Association of Law
Teachers,9 notes that the members "overwhelmingly accept and
endorse the principle thrust of the Law and Learning Report." It
goes on to say:
We take the primary message of the report to be that the pursuit and enhancement
of scholarly research in law in Canada deserves renewed attention, greater moral,
material and institutional support, and a willingness to think about new
administrative structures and other arrangements both within and outside the law
faculties.
1 0
7 Jacques Derrida, its major exponent, has not only strongly influenced literary criticism
but also critical scholarship in the humanities and social sciences and recently law (See, for
example, A. Hutchinson, "From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction" (1984/85)
94 Yale LJ. 209). Deconstruction makes problematic the nature of texts which is not
determined by either authorial intention or reader reception but by the disclosure of structures
of perceptions and meanings which appear as differences (diffdrence/diffdrance).
8 See supra, note 1, background studies.
9 Initial Response on Behalf of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers. Joost Blom
(President), University of British Columbia, 1983.
10 bid at 2.
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The response then outlines those aspects of the Report on
which there is "widespread consensus." A reading of these sections
seems to suggest that there is indeed consensus on "greater moral,
material and institutional support" for what is already being done
and what the Report largely characterizes as "humane
professionalism."11 While the Report recognizes that there is a
"formidable agenda of unfinished business," it finds that "there are
signs that it is being seriously addressed. 12  However, its main
thrust, as Law Teachers legitimately finds, has given rise to the
"most widespread comment and criticism."13  I say "legitimately,"
because an overview of the written responses and discussions indeed
bears out the summary of contentious issues the Law Teachers'
response provides.
This particular response, unlike a number of others, is
carefully worded; it denotes what often appears as a highly emotive
conflict in "Areas of Discussion" and states that "concern has been
expressed about two groups of assumptions that the Report appears
to make."14 The "two groups" are in fact variations of one theme
which re-emerges in the discussion of "two streams in legal
education."15 The theme is the relationship between academic and
professional pursuits, and the tension therein. This is seen as the
crux of the Report, and thus the focus of its strongest criticism,
whether it is in the area of scholarly research versus professional
formation, doctrinal or traditional research versus fundamental
research, or finally two streams of legal education.
The Law Teachers' response tends to mitigate seemingly
sharp if not violent differences. "Some of what these teachers see
as highly coloured descriptions in the Report are no doubt due to
11 Report, supra, note 1 at 47ff.
12 1bid. at 133.
13 Supra, note 9 at 6.
14 Ibid. at 6 (emphasis added).
15 Ibid. at 9ff.
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the Consultative Group's desire to make their points forcefully."1 6
They are forcefully made, because it is one of the major concerns of
the Report that the consensus/collusion between intellectual and
professional interests tends to exclude fundamental conflict/critique
to the long term detriment of both academic and professional
pursuits and especially of society as a whole. The very dialectic and
genuine contradictions expressed in the Report must be addressed
and one can only agree with the concluding statements of the Law
Teachers:
The impetus that the "Law and Learning" Report gives to a renewal of research
efforts, to experimentation, to rethinking legal education and legal scholarship, will
be invaluable to the Canadian legal community. The Consultative Group deserves
every praise for their efforts. The reservations, concerns and criticism that we have
tried to describe in this - very summary - initial response spring from a concern
that the controversial aspects of the Report should be clearly identified and
discussed, so that they will not blunt the impact of the very clear call for renewal
and for action that is the Report's principal theme.
1 7
This particular response has been chosen as a starting point
because it represents a consolidation of various appraisals and
critiques carried on by the Law Teachers. Before undertaking a
more detailed analysis, one further section of the critical part of this
response should be considered. It is "experience in other
jurisdictions" which was found to be inadequately investigated by the
Report. This might be fair criticism (and appears as such in the
response) if it did not invoke the spectre of a habitual process in
this field: If you want new ideas, go to other jurisdictions. The
Report bases itself squarely on what it sees to be the Canadian
experience. This is not to say that once the ideas and the
recommendations of the Report are in the process of being
concretized, one should not look to other jurisdictions for
experience with similar developments; it is surely time to extricate
ourselves from a deeply ingrained colonial attitude. As it is, the
Report is castigated by at least one response for its colonial attitude,
16 bid. at 7.
17 Ibid. at 13.
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especially in regard to leading American law schools.18 The fact is
that most of the legal academics in common law faculties have
received their graduate education in the U.S. (Masters - 46%;
Doctorate - 29%) and England (Masters - 28%; Doctorate - 48%)
but few in Canada (21% and 13% respectively).1 9 On the other
hand, reviews from the U.S. and the U.K. seem to be much more
generous in giving the Report indigenous status, expressing the wish
that it should be replicated in the other jurisdictions.
20
II. FORMS OF INTERPRETATIONS
It may well be, as some responses to the Report seem to
imply, that all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds and
that we need only more of it; that there really is no conflict
between received notions and fundamental enquiry. It may well be
that law is a form of theology, of metaphysics in which received
notions do have fundamental status and that its appropriate method
therefore is careful doctrinal analysis. That its reasoning and its
teaching is legitimately pre-Baconian, that the only place law can
give to the vogue of science, and scholarship derived from it, is in
the realm of fact and not of law, properly so-called. If this should
be so, the critical and defensive posture of law teachers and law
professionals cannot just be seen in terms of power and self-interest
but must be accorded its own validity. If the very basis of law is the
profession of authoritative pronouncements (giving witness to
revelation) then the separation between scholarship and praxis,
between academic and professional, is indeed misconceived. The
Report does not claim that there is no relationship between the two.
It continuously and strenuously insists that there is. However, it has
18 W.E. Conklin in Reviews and Comments, supra, note 1 at 37.
19 Source: Survey of Canadian Law Professors, supra, note 1 at 64 (Q6A):
Total US UK Can Other
LI.M. 169 78 48 36 7
Doct. 31 9 15 4 3
20 See, for example, the extensive review by I. Fletcher in (1984) 4 Leg. Stud. at 349.
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a different conception of scholarship. "Law, in short, is an
undisputed social fact, an obvious subject of scholarly inquiry.
21
Thus, it stresses predominantly interdisciplinary and empirical work,
downgrading - as many respondents complain - doctrinal research.
In "The Development of Legal Scholarship in Canada,"22 the Report
deplores its inability to give a full account of historical and
jurisprudential legal scholarship in Canada, due to the paucity of
materials. "However, if our impressionistic sketch at least provokes
revisionist reviews and challenges, it will have served an important
purpose."23 It certainly received "revisionist reviews and challenges."
Whether that served an important purpose remains to be seen.
Some of the responses to the Report, especially in their
more vehement forms, are difficult to sustain in a close textual
reading. There are repeated references to what may be called
"authorial intention".24 And yet, in a way peculiar to law, the
Report, even in the most negative criticism, is treated like an
authority although it claims to be exploratory. Its recommendations
are halting and less than definitive, anticipating development rather
than proposing detailed models for implementation. Rarely,
however, is the project carried forward in the responses: rather it
is treated like a case which sets dangerous or welcome precedents.
And maybe it does. However, as in the interpretation of a case,
(which actually means the interpretation of a judgment), the reading
of particulars depends on the basic assumptions made about law, and
the fundamental conceptions held; not only about law but about
theory and practice and the relationship between the two. If law is
seen predominantly as legal practice (cases) in need of theories to
21 Supra, note 1 at 3.
22 Ibid. at 63ff.
23 Ibid. at 63.
24 It is a common practice to refer to a report by the name of the chairman of the
committee or commission. In this particular case it was also perceived that Arthurs was the
primary author and some responses guessed what he might have meant beyond what the
Report actually said. (See for example, M. Weisberg, "On the Relationship of Law and
Learning to Law and Learning" (1983/84) 29 McGill LJ. 155). I personally felt that the
Report was far too conciliatory but was proven wrong by many of the responses and
discussions.
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maintain its purposive values of order, certainty, predictability, and
finality, then positive doctrinal work will be seen as the hallmark of
scholarship. If, on the other hand, law is seen as social practice,
determined by and dependent on other social forces, then a critical
theory is necessary to explain the very nature of "law" and its effects
by questioning its values. Thus, for instance, critical legal
scholarship focuses on the indeterminacy and uncertainty of legal
outcomes when measured by doctrinal standards which are exposed
as a cover for other values embodied in political ideology.
The academic/professional dichotomy is, at least to some
extent, a second order problem. Every profession now tends to
legitimate itself through its academic and educational underpinnings.
There is no access now to the recognized professions except through
university studies and one must keep in mind that in Canada, for
law, this is a rather recent development. Conversely, most other
academic pursuits now try to legitimate themselves by their
professionalism: we now have professional philosophers, sociologists,
historians - even professional writers. Academic legitimation is full
of practical, relevant, and job oriented pursuits taking its orientation
from the market, or that which the market is deemed to be or to
become. The Report repeatedly stresses unmet needs for law in
society and hence law-jobs which are not envisaged by present
professional conceptions. Some responses see in the Report not
only an anti-professional attitude but also an anti-academic one,
especially when academic is understood in a traditional sense, such
as doctrinal analysis.
The major controversies seem to arise from what may be
characterized as conceptions of law as an open or closed system or
in Kuhn's terms, as a struggle of paradigms.25 The Report declares:
"What we wish to stress at the outset is that law is shaped by
culture, economics, history and technology and that in turn it helps
to shape them."26 This seems, on the surface, unproblematic and
can be interpreted in various ways by various groups. However, the
Report sharpens the problem by adding: "Law is thus at once an
25 T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970) especially c. V.
2 6 Supra, note 1 at 5.
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exotic fossil and a commonplace living organism."27 In other words,
the law is both a closed system and an open one. The Report is
even-handed by using expressions such as "fossil" on the one side
and "commonplace" on the other. Its major thrust, however, is
clearly towards opening the system:
But what efforts have we made to understand how law is made and administered,
its impact on our economy, our political life, our social relationships, or its cultural
significance? What attention have we devoted to the education of those who are
concerned with law as scholars or public administrators, as journalists or critics?28
The issue of academic versus professional is not primarily an
issue of allegiance to academic or professional demands. The Con-
sultative Group which issued the Report consisted mainly of legal
academics,29 so did the Advisory Panel,30 and the list of participants
in the Regional Consultation.31 As well, those submitting briefs32
show a similar distribution. The terms of reference for the
Consultative Group were, after all: "To examine and advise upon
legal research and education in Canada." Most of the responses,
critical as well as laudatory, come from the same quarters. The
Report remarks:
Specifically we received no formal briefs from any professional, governmental or
quasi-governmental body, for the most part not even a pro forma acknowledgement
of our direct invitation to submit briefs, and a low rate of acceptance - and even
2 7 Ibid.
28 Ibid. at 4.
29 Of the eight members, five came from law faculties, one from political science, one
was a judge and another a member of the federal Department of Justice (both with academic
reputations). Supra, note 1 at viii.
30 Of the 23 members of the Advisory Panel, 14 came from law faculties (two non-
lawyers), three from other academic departments, two were judges and four practitioners. It
was chaired by the then Chief Justice Bora Laskin. Ibid at ix-x.
31 Participants are listed in the Consultation Reports, supra, note 1.
32 Supra, note 1 at 183-86.
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a lower rate of attendance - by individuals associated with such bodies who were
asked to join our regional consultations on a personal basis.
3
The background studies, too, were directed to law faculties,
legal scholarship and education. It is therefore no wonder (although
it seemed to be a surprise for some) that the Report would focus on
academic concerns and would try to increase their ambit.
The Report attempts to locate itself historically, an attempt
which is curiously missing from many of the critical responses. This
is no accident. As Marx once remarked: "Men make their own
history, but they do not make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past. ' 34  On the other hand, historians have
often remarked on the tendency of law to present itself as not
historical, even where it uses historical sources as authorities.3 5 The
lack of interest in legal history, especially in Canadian law schools,
has been sufficiently lamented. 6  Historians of law are often
puzzled by the connections legal historians make establishing
continuity by ignoring differences in context and meaning. Many of
what are espoused to be age-old and hallowed traditions of the
common law turn out to be of rather recent origin, at least as far as
their particular understanding is concerned. The question is not
whether doctrinal is better or worse than empirical research or even
whether it is more important. The question is what is missing and
in need of change at a given historical juncture. Even if we grant
an intellectual autonomy to law and hence to legal scholarship,
education and practice, the need for re-interpretation is clear,
although more pressing at some time than another, in some fields
33 Ibid. at 5-6.
34 IC Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. I, para. 2.
35 See, for example, D. Hay, 'The Criminal Prosecution in England and Its Historians"
(1984) 47 Mod. L. Rev. 1, esp. at 2.
36 See, for example, G. Parker, 'qhe Masochism of the Legal Historian" (1974) 24
U.T.L.J. at 279.
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more so than in others 7 Kuhn, for instance, distinguishes between
"normal science as puzzle-solving," and "crisis and the emergence of
scientific theories."
38
III. INTEGRITY, AUTONOMY AND BOUNDARIES
The Report has been repeatedly accused of denigrating the
academic status, if not stature, of law schools and law teachers.
Whether those have or have not adopted the common nomenclature
of the university, they have for some time transformed themselves
into law faculties and law professors. There is nothing in the
Report that one cannot repeatedly hear in faculty offices and
common-rooms, hallways, washrooms, and classrooms, by faculty or
students. Even some of the most severe critics of the Report have
been known to raise similar issues, albeit with somewhat different
interpretations. The question is not - as it is often formulated, and
in all fairness the Report does at times provoke such formulations
- whether law faculties are academically better or worse than other
faculties. Arguments can be made both ways, depending on the
orientation one adopts. Isolationism and closed system thinking is
not peculiar to law faculties. It is pervasive in almost all faculties
and departments of the university and furthered by almost all
disciplines in order to make claims on professional autonomy and
turf. Among the social and behavioural sciences, it can be said that
psychologists are no less prone to doctrinal squabbles and oriented
more towards their own literature than to human needs; sociologists
write and teach more the jargon of sociology than give expressions
to social concerns; and economists are more fascinated by economics
than the material well-being of all members of a society.
The problem of artificial boundaries, of more and more
about less and less, of the reification of theoretical claims, of the
generalization of specifics, of seeing the world through one lens
37 I have discussed this theme at greater length in "Criminal Law: Is There a Legal or
Social Logic Left for Its Renewal?" in P. Fitzgerald, ed., Crime, Justice and Codification
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 31.
38 Supra, note 25.
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only, is part of our heritage of rational-instrumental reasoning. It
leads to the production of idiots savants or Fachidioten for which we
do not even have a good English word. It is, however, the raison
d'etre of industrial commodity production, a process for which the
academy sees itself more and more in the business of supplying the
human widgets? That even industrial production no longer needs
them in the quantity supplied is a different point.
This scheme is not part of any special knowledge formation,
expression, and transmission; on the contrary, this increasingly
partialized knowledge no longer knows what it is a part of and so
remains apart, and each part attempts to construct the universe in
its own image. Interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary studies which
the Report stresses may make the isolation more obvious.
Experience in other disciplines shows that what starts out as an
inter- or cross-disciplinary endeavour soon becomes another enclave,
indeed another discipline with its own language and mode of
reasoning, its own adherents and promoters, or it fails, or both in
rapid succession, whether they are specific combinations such as
socio-biology or conglomerates such as criminology. Law has tended
to keep some distance but is not exempted, as the proliferation of
courses entitled "Law and ..." show. The very conjunction "and"
indicates that there is a recognition that law meets all kinds of other
disciplines and systems on its way. It also indicates, however, that
their mutual autonomy is to remain intact. This, of course, is
neither theoretically nor practically possible. Subjects such as "Law
and Economics" have a definite theoretical impact on legal thinking,
if they have any impact at all; and subjects such as "Law and
Psychiatry" not only influence their mutual theories, but also
practices, and often at the lowest common denominator.
Every philosophy from Plato to Hegel that is worth both its
name and its recollection had to work out its own conception of
law.39 Every religion contains it. Science has appropriated the term
for its own use. Ideology (this curious modern ball of wax of all
three rolled into one) has to deal with it in one way or another,
indeed has to adopt one form or another if it is to retain any claim
39 H. Cairns, Legal Philosophy From Plato to Hegel (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
1949).
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on praxis. Marxism is a case in point; neither state nor law show
any signs of withering away. Liberalism has taken the law so much
for granted as its highest accomplishment that it takes it to be its
base rather than its superstructure, which indeed it now is. This
made it possible to dispense with a critical philosophy of law and
replace it by a legitimizing legal philosophy; to dispense with a
critical history and replace it by a legal history which would show its
own continuity with scant reference to context. As the most
elaborate systematic expression of a social and political philosophy
of liberalism, law could also claim to be its own social and political
science. It was well on its way to establish the kind of autonomy
which is now so vigorously questioned.40
"The ideology of the law was crucial in sustaining the
hegemony of the English ruling class."41  This is an assertion
somewhat different from those associated with the "rule of law."
Somewhat different, because it does not deny that law has autonomy
and that it constitutes a form of power; but only that it was not
neutral, that it indeed served some purposes and that in its
historical, social, and political context it expressed a system of beliefs
which we now call ideology. The statement itself clearly expresses
an ideological shift. If it had said: "The idea of law was crucial in
sustaining the English form of social order," it would have been well
within the rule of law conception. By introducing "hegemony" and
"ruling class," it not only introduces concepts of power and social
and political differentiation but also another ideological perspective
which challenges what is taken for granted.
Critics of the Report often object to what they take to be a
belittling of legal scholarship, and particularly doctrinal analysis.
42
This evidences a misunderstanding of the whole thrust and purpose
of the Report. In essence, the Report argues that legal scholarship
40 In The English context this becomes especially apparent in the connections of the
Bentham, Mill, Austin and Stephen families and their relationship to the Colonial Office.
41 D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in Hay et al eds, Albion's Fatal
Tree, (London: Penguin, 1975) 17 at 56.
42 See, for example, T.A. Cromwell, "In the Matter of an Arbitration Between the Union
of Doctrinal and Theoretical Legal Scholars and the Consultative Group on Research and
Education in Law" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 761.
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has been too narrowly circumscribed, and that much of legal
scholarship flows from the perceived need of current practice,
current education, and what we currently call law reform, and not
enough flows from the kind of enquiry which reaches out to other
disciplines and other methods, and indeed, other needs in society.
The Report positively notes "the significant efforts made by law
professors to produce law reform and other commissioned studies,
and teaching materials;" and it accepts "the intrinsic legitimacy of
each of these other types of writing;" and concedes that they "may
also reveal high intellectual attainment."'43 In terms of its own
thrust, however, it also notes: "But in important respects they are
not scholarly. They too are prepared for a particular purpose that
necessarily constrains the direction, methodology, scope, length and
intensity of the inquiry.''44  One could have assumed that,
particularly for academics, this would be self-evident. Judging from
the response, it obviously is not.
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF SCHOLARSHIP
In a sense, even the negative responses legitimate the
Report. To the extent to which they are overly defensive they
disclose what the Report in fact castigates. The point is not
whether one agrees or disagrees with certain directions the Report
indicates in terms of legal scholarship or education. These should
indeed be discussed critically because they are by no means clear at
this point in time. The professional/academic dichotomy only makes
sense to the extent to which it spells out the limits of these pursuits.
A professional opinion is not likely to be appropriate if it is based
on an entirely different set of assumptions from those current in
practice. Equally, the more fundamental scholarly work which the
Report finds in short supply is not likely to answer "practical"
questions in the present process. The doctrinal/interdisciplinary
dichotomy is only fruitful to the degree it sheds light on its
respective assumptions. So, for instance, much of the work in
43 Report, supra, note 1 at 136.
4 4
/bid.
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critical legal studies is also centered on doctrinal analysis, albeit in
a different form and informed by interdisciplinary studies.45
A report on law and learning, at this point in time, can only
be a beginning. It is surprising to see that it is so often perceived
as a closure. Reports, by tradition are bound to make
recommendations. This creates a dilemma when we are faced with
such a variety of perceptions as to what is important in and for law.
There is hardly a law school that has not for years debated and
experimented with curriculum reform. To accommodate the variety
of perceptions, curricula have become filled with optional courses,
especially in second and third year, giving credence to the critics of
the Report who claim that legal education is not as narrow as the
Report perceives it to be, and that it in fact already offers the wider
perspective the Report claims is needed. There is an apparent
paradox because the "Law and ..." courses - usually followed by the
name of another discipline - have indeed proliferated.
The very first recommendation of the Report addresses this
issue: "Law faculties should substitute for their present elective
curriculum a series of clearly defined alternatives..... 46 The issue for
the Report is not one of topological variety, but of "alternatives
based on intellectual insights, social goals, pedagogic approaches, or
professional specialities."47  Some critics are now concerned that
intellectual insights and pedagogic approaches would thus fall under
institutional control, although the Report explains:
The premises of eclecticism were both negative and positive. Its negative premise
was that students should be released from the bondage of the old "classical"
curriculum; its positive premise was that they would use their new freedom to
choose individual courses of study reflecting their academic interests and
professional aspirations. In our judgment, the negative has proved itself but the
positive has not.
48
45 A clear example is the work of Duncan Kennedy.
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Eclecticism was to be replaced by pluralism "which offers a genuine
choice of identifiable alternatives."
49
For many academics, this raises the spectre of another round
of laborious and tedious curriculum reforms at a time when they
would rather devote their energies to the individual development of
courses which meet their academic aspirations and problem
definition, or to the re-development of content and method of old
courses in this direction. These can be accomplished individually
without structural changes, which need a much higher level of
consensus. Yet the Report is hardly wrong when one considers the
common complaint that in spite of the apparent richness of options,
courses appear to be repetitive. They tend to share the common
stock of legal theories and methods or where they do not, their
relevance to law tends to be questioned.
The second recommendation already states: "Among the
alternatives offered should be clearly defined scholarly
programmes.....5 0 The supporting text anticipates what nevertheless
became a major controversy by carefully stating that this is offered
as a "conceptual model, an ideal type" and that it does not "presume
to propose how, where or when such developments might be
undertaken," nor does it intend "to describe the curriculum of the
new scholarly stream.....5 1 The opposition to this recommendation,
which is central to the Report, exemplifies the dilemma. The
Canadian Association of Law Teachers state, in their response:
"Many would argue that it is precisely between the law's practical
application on the one hand and its fundamental structure and
forces that shape it, on the other, that gives the study of law its
intellectual interest and vitality."52 Thus, the question is not whether
they should or should not interact; nobody would argue the latter,
nor does the Report. The question remains whether we do have
4 9 
ibid.
5 0 Ibid. at 155.
51 Ibid. at 141.
52 Supra, note 9 at 7-8.
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two hands for clapping or essentially only one. As one faculty
response reflects: "Inconsistency ... is debilitating ... [b]ut
contradictions can energize."53 All that theoretical pursuits can do
in the context of professional concerns is to point out
inconsistencies. To become a contradiction in the true sense, theory
has to be grounded in a different understanding. Anomalies, as
Kuhn expressed it, do not in and by themselves lead to a new
paradigm s4
V. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT
The recommendations of the Report seem to have been less
controversial than the text itself. They are organized under four
headings: Legal Education; Promotion of Research; Professional
and Judicial Needs and Contributions; and, The Public Interest in
Legal Research and Education.a5  Of the seventeen Recommenda-
tions on Legal Education, the first two summarize the basic thrust
of the Report. The remainder show a great deal of latitude in how
the Report might be implemented. On the positive side, the
recommendations call on the various law schools to build on their
own strength and develop their own identity. On the negative side,
they allow a host of interpretations, including the one that whatever
is reasonable is already being done.
The twenty-three recommendations dealing with the
Promotion of Research are largely structural and financial, in order
to provide a basis for the kind of research envisaged in the Report.
Scholars are asked to "make a conscious effort to diversify the
approaches they take," to "turn to more fundamental studies using
historical, theoretical, comparative and empirical approaches."
56
Objections have been raised against the apparent institutionalization
53 Response of the Queen's Law Faculty Committee drafted by M. Pickard at 4.
54 Kuhn, supra, note 25 at 52ff.
55 Report, supra, note 1 at 154-63.
56 Ibid. at 157, Recommendation 18.
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of scholarship, a function of the institutional nature of the
recommendations. In fact, the Report stresses that legal scholars
should as much as possible respond to "their own sense of
intellectual priorities, rather than the priorities of governments and
granting bodies,"57 and that "[flunding agencies should be aware of
the particular need to respond to research priorities that are deemed
most important by researchers themselves."
58
The ten recommendations under Professional and Judicial
Needs and Contributions also stress the development of a wider base
for scholarship and research in practice. "We propose the
development of a significant 'academic' constituency outside the law
faculties......59  The last seven recommendations under The Public
Interest in Legal Research and Education deal mainly with access to
legal information, education, and practice. These sets of
recommendations are largely derivative, since the Committee did not
undertake an inquiry into practices or public needs. According to
Statistics Canada, lawyers now are about evenly divided between the
self-employed and the salaried, "many of the latter working for the
organs of government and business as employees."60 The percentage
of "self-employed lawyers" decreased from 68% in 1961 to 51% in
1981. These are self-definitions and do not include graduates of law
schools who no longer identify themselves as lawyers. "These figures
taken together suggest that traditional autonomous practice is rapidly
ceasing to be the usual occupational setting for Canadian lawyers."
61
This, however, must be seen in context. The registered membership
of the profession has more than doubled between 1971 and 1981.
The extent to which these developments serve the public interest
remains an open question. It may well be that "[t]he professions
(and most notably the legal profession) bring to bear dispassionate,
5 7 
Ibid.
5 8 Ibid. at 157, Recommendation 38.
59 Ibid. at 160.
60 C. McKie, 'The Law - A Changing Profession" (1986) Can. Soc. Trends at 30.
61 Ibid. at 32.
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informed and critical judgment on the maintenance of societal and
personal order."62 The question remains, whose order, cui bono.
Arthurs, in a subsequent report draws "A Map of
Understandings about Law," in which he attempts to portray the
ideological and intellectual perspectives expressed in legal work and
legal writing.63  He shows that, along both dimensions, the
conception and expression of law is a narrow one in Canadian legal
work. The very title of his book, Without the Law, makes
problematic the standard formal concept (the law). 64 The legal
pluralism which Arthurs stresses is strategic in opening up the
question of law, rather than being definitive in answering it. This is
also true of the Report. Since its focus is on legal scholarship and
legal education, it seeks to lay out the conditions under which the
plurality of legal forms and conceptions becomes visible as a basis
for a new understanding of law. It does not provide a unified
theoretical framework. "Pluralism" is mainly an empirical response
to "rule of law" assertions, to its centralism and hegemonic
properties.
In stressing empirical and interdisciplinary studies, the Report
- in my view - is looking for a critical base upon which doctrinal
assumptions can be re-examined. If taken as an ultimate aim, law
would appear as an epiphenomenon, a super-structure, which cannot
be understood on its own grounds but only on the grounds of
politics, economics, psychology, and even biology. This reductionism
62 Ibid. at 29.
63 Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,
"Law as an Instrument of State Intervention: A Framework for Enquiry' Vol. 46, J. Bernier
and H. Lajole eds, Law, Society and the Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1986) at 85.
64 Without the Law - Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century
England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985). This work, although starting from
similar premises, develops a very different thrust from J.S. Auerbach's Justice Without Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). For a rudimentary comparative analysis see my
review of both in (1986) U.N.B.LJ. 248.
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is curiously shared by the left and the right, b , critical legal theory,
as well as the law and economics movement.
6
In the Canadian context, the Charter66 has brought with it
the unfortunate consequence of increasingly side-tracking the
essential concerns of the Report in terms of both scholarship and
education. The Charter has given a new life-line to doctrinal work,
as well as to the eclecticism of "Law and ...," which has now been
transformed into "... and the Charter."67 The judicial domination of
law in the "rule of law" paradigm, leading to the centrality of
caselaw in doctrinal scholarship and in legal education has, if
anything, been extended. Rather than a politicization of law we
experience a legalization of politics.68
On the positive side (grudgingly acknowledging the legal
reality of the Charter), one can at least assume that the essential
questions of legal theory and its empirical base will re-appear in
every Charter challenge, even if it may take some time before the
need for a coherent legal theory becomes apparent in contradictory
results. The next section will address the question of legal theory
in the light of the doctrinal/empirical split raised in the Report and
bemoaned by its critics.
65 Duncan Kennedy has addressed this problem in what is still an "incomplete and
preliminary draft" of "Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: Toward a Critical
Phenomenology of the Rule of Law" (personal communication).
6 6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, Schedule
B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
67 Although the Charter appeared as a resolution of Parliament in December of 1981 and
was proclaimed in April of 1982, it had no impact on the Report.
68 See, for example, A. Potter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct. L.R. 43;
H. Glasbeek and M. Mandel, "rhe Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in R. Martin, ed., Critical Perspectives on the
Constitution (1984), 2 Socialist Studies 84.
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VI. DEFINING THEORY AND RESEARCH
The Report develops a typology of legal research most
concisely expressed in what has been dubbed the "Arthurs Box."
69
This typology is derived from a topological analysis of legal
writings.70 It arrives essentially at four types:
1. conventional texts and articles - research designed to collect and
organize legal data, to expound legal rules, and to explicate or offer exegesis upon
authoritative legal sources;
2. legal theory - research designed to yield a unifying theory or
perspective by which legal rules may be understood, and their application in
particular cases evaluated and controlled; this type would include scholarly
commentary on civil law, usually referred to as doctrine;
3. law reform research - research designed to accomplish change in the
law, whether to eliminate anomalies, to enhance effectiveness, or to secure a change
in direction;
4. fundamental research - research designed to secure a deeper
understanding of law as a social phenomenon, including research on the historical
philosophical, linguistic, economic, social or political implications of law.
7 1
Fige4 Type of Legal Rearh
69 Report, supra, note 1 at 67.
70 For a further development of this typology see Arthurs, supra, note 64 and infra, note
71 Report, supra, note 1 at 66.
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The forces operating on this field clearly disclose the major
dichotomies discussed thus far: Academic/Professional and
Doctrinal/Interdisciplinary. The distribution of space in the field
also discloses the major concern of the Report, namely, that not
enough attention is paid to legal theory and especially to funda-
mental research. In a later "Map of Understandings about Law,"
Arthurs rearranges this topology along two dimensions; Intellectual
Perspectives and Ideological Perspectives, which he then applies to
"Assumptions of Legal Functionaries about Law."72 "Intellectual
Perspectives" are categorized as: "Law as Rule;" "Law as Tool;"
"Law in Context;" "Systematic Empiricism;" and "Deep Theory."
Although those topologies can be defended as descriptive topologies
they present an analytical problem. In terms of theory we must
assume that, underlying every practice, there is a theory. Thus, we
may re-interpret "Law as Rule" as Settled Theory; "Law as Tool" as
Applied Settled Theory; "Law in Context" as Settled Legal Theory
Meets other Theories. Systematic Empiricism also depends on a
theory which is now generally defined as positivism (if, as in "Law
as Rule," theory is seen as settled). We are then left with "Deep
Theory," which Arthurs defines as "concerned to identify the
organizing principles or constituent forces which give shape and
meaning to law."' 3 In our present understanding of theory we can
give it two meanings: unified or general theory, or critical theory.
With the demise of positivism, which leaves systematic empiricism
high and dry (and makes problematic the meaning of "Law in
Context",) we only seem to have critical theory available to us as
"Deep Theory." In Kant's Citique of Pure Reason, he writes at the
end of his analysis of Deep Theory: "Concerning the observers of
scientific method, they have now the choice to proceed either
dogmatically or sceptically: in any case they have to proceed
systematically. - The critical path alone is still open to us."74 There
72 Figures 2-1 and 2-2 in Arthurs, supra, note 64 at 85, 88, resp. See also App. A.
73 Ibid at 86.
74 I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1968) BD.IV,
at 711-12, translated as Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by N.K. Smith, (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1956).
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is, however, a special problem with law. It neither fits into the
natural sciences nor into the social sciences; we cannot deduct its
general nature simply from its institutions and their workings. It is
neither pure logic nor accumulated experience, neither subjective
nor objective. It cannot be deducted from a metaphysics of morals
nor from empirical events. Further, law is too old and too
important in human affairs to be simply seen as an epiphenomenon.
It is not likely to wither away as a concept although specific forms
and understandings may.
In the context of the Report and the discussion it aroused,
I submit that we should consider law as a theory sui generis, not
autonomous - no real theory is such unless it is reified - but on the
contrary, a theory of theory, an epistemology, a theory of
knowledge. A theory as we generally speak of it in science is
characterized by the question: A theory of what? And the answer
is generally referential to some empirical phenomenon. In other
words, how can one know this or that. But if we ask the question,
what is law a theory of in relation to empirical facts, we will not
easily arrive at an answer. It is at this point that we now tend to
turn to other disciplines which apparently have a stronger claim on
addressing the empirical world. We see this in the proliferation of
"Law and ..." courses, conferences, institutes, et cetera: Law and
Society, Law and Social Theory, Law and Economics and so on and
so forth; or their naturalized offshoots such as Women and the Law,
Children and the Law, et cetera; or their praxis implications such as
clinical legal education, social advocacy, and the legalization of
politics. (An answer that law is a theory of justice or a theory of
rights only converts empirical facts into analytical components and
deprives us of an epistemology of the phenomenological
characteristics of law, of what divides questions of law from
questions of justice.)
It is a rich field of investigation which the Report
recommends to us. However, both friends and foes have tended to
construct its thrust too narrowly. It is a field necessarily fraught
with tensions and frustrations, at least at this point in time. The
basic problem is that the empirical and interdisciplinary thrust tends
to make law derivative and some indeed claim that is all that law is.
In the words of Marx, law is a superstructure. But all Marx can
claim is that on the basis of his analysis, the law as well as the state
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ought to wither away - not a very encouraging conclusion for law
schools and legal scholars even though there may be a lot of critical
mileage in it. Tushnit expressed it in a whimsical way that shows
the embarrassment: "Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure.t75
The relationship of law and fact has always been problematic.
Coke, for instance, said long ago that there was no such thing as
criminal law, there was only a law of murder, theft, and so on.
What such a statement intends to do is, of course, to draw our
attention to the empirical referents and their differences.
Substantively he clearly has a point. We all feel that we should
treat murder differently from minor shoplifting. But in the adjectival
sense Coke's statement is problematic because our principles and
procedures are largely the same for all offences. If this were not so
we would indeed have no criminal law. This law's self-understanding
is almost exclusively derived from its adjectival form and not the
nature of substantive offences. It is this adjectival form which one
can claim to be a theory of theory, an epistemology, and further that
it is perennial and intrinsic.
Although historical and cross-cultural comparisons usually
stress differences in the conceptions of law, basic similarities are far
more stunning. Some references to our tradition make this point.
Plato's Laws is indeed his last work following the Republic, this
fount and foundation of political theory. His Laws has always been
somewhat of a puzzle to philosophers; political theorists have tended
to ignore it and legal scholars have not said much about it because
it is rather self-evident to a lawyer, and it is very difficult to
recapture the monumental effort it must have been to cast the
results of his philosophical investigations into a legal form.
Aristotle's Ethics is as much a deontology as an ethics in the
English sense of the terms (in French, d6ontologie is often used for
the English "ethics;" its derivation from deontos (right, needful)
clearly shows that it relates itself more toward what is right and
necessary than what is good and desired). Aristotle's Politics
especially demonstrates that it owes much more to the kind of
discourse we would now identify with legal forms rather than those
of philosophical or political discourse. We know that Aristotle had
75 (1981) 90 Yale LJ. 1205.
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an abiding interest in constitutional law and an extensive collection
of constitutions even though the authorship of The Constitution of
Athens is still debated.
The Decalogue has rightly been hailed as a monumental
achievement, compared with its oriental predecessors such as the
Code of Hammurabi, even though it may appear to us as a much
more primitive legal form. The accounts we have of the trials of
Socrates and Jesus contain all the adjectival elements one may
possibly want to get across in a criminal procedure course.
The point is that there is substance to the claim of an
autonomy of law if we consider law as a theory of theory, a meta-
theory if you wish, which expresses itself as an epistemology, a form
of ordering knowledge which cannot be reduced to the level of
scientific theories with their claim on the production of a specific set
of empirical facticities. Science also uses the word "law," but in the
sense that describes the order of things in the light of the very
theoretical perspective it uses. What is right and what is good is
not located in the theoreticity of science, only in the nature of its
work and its effects. Law, on the other hand, although we have
claimed it to be value neutral, must form its very notion of
theoreticity on the basis of competing value claims and factual
constructions. If law enters directly into the production of facticities
and purports them to be factualities (and it now largely does), it is
in danger of abandoning its own intrinsic values as a synthetic
theory.
In contemporary parlance the praxis of law does not produce
facticities but produces texts which the theory of law must
deconstruct. In order to do this, law must move beyond critical
theory and phenomenology, which are the basis of critical legal
studies, to a hermeneutics which is very much in the tradition of law
although it is now largely espoused by other fields, from sociology to
literary criticism. Law is not only in the business of ordering facts;
it is primarily in the business of ordering consciousness and
conscience to make sense and give meaning to the "dense facticities
of everyday life," to use Schutz' poignant term.
Having spiralled law into high theory and almost out of sight,
what about empiricism? If it wants to give sense and meaning to
what becomes problematic in the dense facticities of everyday life,
law must address itself to facts and the social order, and must
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understand the ideological and political forms underlying this order.
Law puts people behind bars; determines what is whose property
and what promises must be honoured; gives us negotiable rights; and
so on. Surely we can say that the law, at least as a practice,
produces its own set of facts and transforms them into a factuality,
which in turn becomes a social actuality. And that is a fact. The
prisoner behind bars is not just a symbol of deviance as sociologists
would have it. The sheriff who carts away our goods or closes our
business, or the welfare officer who takes away our children, do not
just symbolize power. They have power, legitimated by law, which
changes the very condition of people's lives. There is nothing
esoteric about that.
Curiously, even cases, the epitome of the law/fact
combination, tell us little about that. Legal analysis generally stops
with the judgment, the finding, the sentence; most often as refined
by appeals which generally stay away from re-considering facts. So,
how much do we actually know about the factual basis of legal
decisions and especially their factual consequences in everyday life?
Only by chance do we learn that some of the leading cases of the
highest authority quoted in our casebooks have very little to do with
what actually occurred. For instance, I happened to learn only by
chance that in a leading custody case in which the court awarded
the children to the mother, she subsequently returned the children
to the father. Where we do have empirical work we know, for
instance, that awards for maintenance are never collected in the
majority of cases. Many more examples could be added, even
without considering cases settled during the course of a legal
proceeding because the judgment would have been undesirable for
both parties. I am by now slightly amused by the hostility I can
draw from well trained students when asking after they cite a case:
"What happened then?" As one answered rather curtly and I am
afraid correctly: "This is not the point." It amuses me less that in
a criminal case the judge is functus as soon as he signs the
committal papers. The law has done its work no matter what the
consequences are.
The Report admonishes us to find out about these things
and this makes good sense. We ought to know what the law is
actually doing rather than just what it claims to be doing. And
there are ways of finding out. Unfortunately, it seems that if we
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engage in empirical research to build or even to improve law, it is
as dicey a business as the doctrinal emanations of the Rule of Law.
Empirical research can only show what the law does, it cannot
determine the structure of its reasoning.
Further, the law has largely lost its traditional legitimacy
because of the loss of credibility in the expression of its theoretical
foundation. Law now wants to acquire legitimacy by good works.
This needs to be questioned. Empirical work can do that and at
present there is almost no other way to test this particular claim on
legitimacy, aside from the attacks on the grounds of political theory.
Empirical findings can show us, in Kuhn's sense, anomalies.
It is, for instance, fairly easy to show now that the criminal law's
claim on providing security and safety for the citizen is largely
erroneous and many of those involved in the criminal law process
will admit it, at least in private. But conversations of this kind
invariably end with: "What else can you do?" Naive social scientists
think they can provide solutions and naive law reformers tend to
take them seriously; for a while anyway. These solutions often tend
to exacerbate the problem because they muddy even further the
theoretical basis of the law in question.
Empirical research can only sharpen the problems for law, it
cannot answer them. To find answers, law has to make empirical
findings an occasion for enquiry into its own theoreticity and its own
doctrines. Law cannot stand in a direct explanatory or actionable
relationship to empirical facts; only in a dialectical one. The life of
the law, to paraphrase Holmes, is not in consensus but in conflict.
Theory and empiricism in the field of legal action are vectors of
tension which have to result in new concordances. Law is not a
theory of what ought to be, nor of what is, but a theory of the
relationship between the two, generating new characterizations of
both.
The value/fact problem is a dilemma we all share and there
are at present no commonly shared methods as to how to resolve it.
The Report recognizes this in its first recommendation on the
Promotion of Research:
Legal scholars should make a conscious effort to diversify the approach they take
in their research, as much as possible responding to their own sense of intellectual
priorities rather than the priorities of governments or granting bodies. They should
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
turn to more fundamental studies using historical, theoretical, comparative and
empirical approaches.
7 6
One should add that legal scholars need to find again what
is peculiar or intrinsic to law - its own formal unity and coherent
discourse, which is not achieved by homogenizing the empirical
world, and not derivative from the social order of things. Rather,
it is an expression of order sui generis which makes interpretation
possible for the valuing human agent (the legal person) and makes
the plurality of the empirical world visible. Our recent heritage of
legal positivism, which views the essence of law in "the big stick," in
its enforceability, is not an accomplishment but a failure of law.
It makes law dependent on its over-against which is power, no less
so when dressed up in liberal democratic garb. The Report is right
in cautioning us not to respond (as much as possible) to the
priorities of government or granting bodies, which are in the field of
power but to our sense of intellectual priorities. In ending the
Chapter "Toward a Scholarly Discipline of Law," the Report says:
We wish to end on a note of candour. Adequate funding is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the development of Canadian legal scholarship. What is
indispensable for the cause is imagination, determination and passion.
But this also indicates the impasse we experience at present.
The Report focuses predominantly on institutional and structural
factors. There is, as always, a good deal of determination to be
found in legal work as well as in legal scholarship. Imagination and
passion are not institutional, they are instead personal attributes
which legal education tends to tame and set aside already in first
year. What remains of imagination and passion tends to be socially
and ideologically informed and not by the very nature and workings
of law. It would be difficult, for instance, to bring the work of one
of the more imaginative legal scholars, Roberto Unger, into the
context of law as we know it.78 There are increasing efforts to
bring new intellectual perspectives to bear on the law, perspectives
76 Report, supra, note 1 at 157.
7 7 Ibid. at 150.
78 R.M. Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personaliy (New York. The Free Press, 1984).
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which indeed touch the imagination and passions in other fields.
But the reverse is rarely the case. In the most advanced work we
ask what light the social and political sciences, as well as the
humanities, can throw on the understanding of law, but rarely do
we ask what light law can shed on our understanding of human,
social, and political behaviour. If law cannot do this, we indeed
have to ask the question whether it is an intellectual discipline in its
own right or rather the kind of trade as it is often portrayed.
History speaks against this. Law has been one of the founding
members of the university tradition even if, as in Canada, most law
faculties have been a recent addition to the university. The major
demand of the Report that law must claim a place in the intellectual
and academic community is not an idle one. It cannot be just the
place of a consumer, seeing its provider function only in terms of
the profession. Law is indeed too important to be left to the
lawyers. As outdated as the epistemic ground of the Charter and of
rights-talk may be, the need for justice-talk is perennial. It is the
binding discourse of every community, its shared categorical
imperative. Without a common understanding of what constitutes
property, contracts and wrongs, public and private, no community
from the family to the state can have an honest self-understanding
and is subject to arbitrary forces with or without legal institutions.
How, in the academic context, the social sciences can explain
anything without these basic conceptual structures, is a mystery if
not a mystification. Classical sociologists such as Durkheim and
Weber have been deeply aware of this need. Most of the teachings
in the social sciences no longer are largely ignoring the conceptual
structure of law, even when they address subjects such as the
sociology of law, which tends to be at best a sociology of legal
institutions. Even history which is increasingly making imaginative
use of legal sources, in the end remains puzzled when it comes to
the question of law itself.79 Economics, which takes basic concepts
such as property or contract for granted, or crime for that matter,
cannot possibly effect any major change in social relations (no
matter what its political persuasion is).
7 9 A striking example is E.P. Thompson's often discussed reflection in Whigs and Hunters
(New York: Pantheon, 1975) at 258ff. See, for example, M. Mandel, "Marxism and the Rule
of Law" (1986) 35 U.N.B.LJ. 7 at 18ff.
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One could go on. The point is that there is not only a
deficiency in the academic pursuit of law, which the Report stresses,
but a deficiency of law in academic pursuits. Interdisciplinary
research and especially empirical research which does not address
doctrinal structures is not likely to cure this deficiency. Doctrinal
work, on the other hand, which does not see itself as a theory and
fails to test itself empirically, will not even recognize this deficiency.
Thus, the doctrinal/interdisciplinary split is an unfortunate one. The
professional/academic split is not, since law faculties must strive for
a wider mandate than serving the current needs of the profession.
Many of those needs are in any case better served by training and
practice than by education and research in the scholarly sense. It is
difficult to envisage any major development in this respect at the
undergraduate level. There should be far less resistance to develop
the academic side at the graduate level, which has been sadly
neglected in law in any case.
80
There have been no dramatic changes following the Report,
though it is still too early to judge. There are many small
developments such as the rapprochement of various disciplines, an
increasing commitment to and search for theory, special projects and
undertakings, as well as groupings of legal scholars, around certain
issues and certain commitments which have yet to become a critical
mass to transform institutional structures.
80 The subject of graduate studies, although an integral part of the Report has received
little attention. I have attempted to develop a not-so-modest Proposal for Restructuring
Graduate Studies in Law in November of 1982 and provided a commentary for the National
Conference in 1983. The subject, however, is in need of a much more intensive as well as
extensive analysis.
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